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THE MORAL COMPLEXITY OF CAUSE LAWYERS 
WITHIN THE STATE 
David Luban* 
INTRODUCTION 
Douglas NeJaime’s Cause Lawyers Inside the State1 is a significant 
contribution to our understanding of cause lawyers.  Most basically, 
NeJaime calls attention to a remarkably neglected topic:  cause lawyers who 
work in the state rather than in public interest firms, law school clinics, or 
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  His analysis undermines a 
narrative that students of cause lawyering too often presuppose:  that to be a 
cause lawyer means standing outside the state, and usually in opposition to 
it.  Almost by definition, a “cause” exists because the dominant institutions 
of society have failed to represent the interests and ideas of some subgroup, 
at least in its own eyes; and government is the most dominant of dominant 
institutions.  Causes therefore draw their energy from the desire to change 
the direction the state has taken.  Cause lawyers are a nuisance to the state, 
and they mean to be a nuisance.  It comes as a surprise, then, that they 
would actually be invited to become insiders; that is, no doubt, the main 
reason that cause lawyering within the state has attracted insufficient 
previous attention. 
Of course, there are causes and there are causes:  lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) rights is a cause, but so is the Race for the 
Cure and promoting classical music in public schools.  The latter two will 
hardly ever stand in opposition to government.  I take it that NeJaime’s 
focus is on politically controversial causes, and that will be my focus as 
well. 
NeJaime provides a compelling analysis of the major ways in which 
cause lawyers can operate within the state to further their cause.  His 
scholarship is comprehensive and first-rate. He considers cause lawyers 
working for a variety of causes—not only LGBTQ rights, but also disability 
rights, civil rights and affirmative action, feminist causes, and conservative 
causes. 
 
*  University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center.  I 
drafted this comment while I was Bacon-Kilkenny Distinguished Visiting Professor at the 
Fordham University School of Law, and I would like to express my gratitude to Fordham 
Law School and my Fordham colleagues and students. 
 1. 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649 (2012). 
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The paper raises fascinating questions about how to reconcile the 
lawyers’ two identities, as cause lawyers and as government lawyers.  
Putting the question melodramatically (and with apologies to Tolkien):  
What happens to a cause lawyer when he or she decides to use the Ring of 
Power?  Can she still remain a cause lawyer, or does it transform her, or 
even—keeping Tolkien’s Ring in mind—devour her? 
NeJaime’s paper does not focus directly on the Defense of Marriage Act2 
(DOMA), the subject of this Symposium.  Clearly, the most dramatic 
moment in the DOMA litigation was the government’s reversal of its 
decision to defend DOMA in court.  As NeJaime points out, the 
announcement came from Attorney General Eric Holder,3 not from anyone 
in the government who could be identified as an LGBTQ cause lawyer.  No 
doubt the Attorney General’s announcement came from the appropriate 
level of government, given the significance of the reversal—but it also took 
off the table a potential accusation by DOMA supporters that the 
government had been captured or commandeered by LGBTQ movement 
activists.  Still, until the inside story of the decision making is told, we will 
not actually know the extent to which activists were involved in the 
decision. 
For that reason, I too am not going to focus on DOMA, but rather on 
NeJaime’s broader topic.  My comments will not be critical:  I think 
NeJaime’s article is beautifully done, and I do not disagree with it.  Rather, 
I want to expand a bit on some of the issues it raises.  In Part I of this 
response I offer some conjectures about whether some causes and modes of 
lawyering are more amenable than others to working inside the government.  
These conjectures may help to guide future investigations of cause 
lawyering within government—whether those investigations aim to confirm 
or falsify them.  Part II more directly poses the “Tolkien question” about 
whether cause lawyers have reason to be wary of the Ring of Power.  It too 
is largely conjectural; I offer the conjectures in a spirit of inquiry. 
I.  TWO IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS 
To think through the way that cause lawyers can work in government 
while retaining, in some important sense, their identity as cause lawyers, it 
will be useful to draw some familiar distinctions.  The first has to do with 
the nature of the cause itself; specifically, whether it is “radical” or 
“reformist.”  The second is a long-standing typology that encompasses 
certain ways of pursuing causes:  by delivering individual legal services, by 
“impact” litigation or lobbying, and by subordinating lawyering to 
 
 2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 3. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
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movement organizing.4  These may be labeled the service, law reform, and 
organizing models of cause lawyering.5  My conjecture is that law reform-
oriented lawyers are more likely candidates for working within government 
(except perhaps at the local level) than either service providers or 
organizers.  As I now argue, that does not mean that radical lawyers cannot 
work in government, but government service will almost certainly 
transform the way their radicalism expresses itself. 
A.  Radical vs. Law Reform 
As I will use the terms, a radical cause is one that advances a wholesale 
restructuring of existing institutions, while the law reform cause does not, 
or at least not necessarily.  It might be thought that being a cause lawyer 
automatically lends itself to reform rather than radicalism, because it 
requires using the mechanisms of the law, which are inherently 
conservative.  As Lenin wrote with his characteristic venom, “[L]awyers 
. . . are the most reactionary of people.”6  A law student himself until he 
was expelled from the university for his politics, Lenin had the movement-
activist’s innate suspicion of lawyers:  “Lawyers should be kept well in 
hand and made to toe the line, for there is no telling what dirty tricks this 
intellectualist scum will be up to.”7  (Lenin feared that “[e]ven a smart 
liberal lawyer” representing Bolsheviks arrested for political crimes might 
try to mollify the judges by describing socialism in anodyne terms or—
heaven forbid!—asserting that in reality the movement is peaceful.)8 
One might also think that government service filters out the most radical 
of lawyers, who would not be appointed and in any case would not find it 
attractive.  That is almost certainly true of radical opponents of state power.  
But in fact there are notable examples of radical lawyers who entered 
government service not to dismantle the state like Lenin, but to redirect it in 
startling ways.  One might begin by focusing on lawyers on the right during 
the administration of President George W. Bush.  Some of the most 
prominent of these lawyers, such as David Addington and John Yoo, 
wished to promote a radically pro-executive-power ideological agenda.9  Or 
consider former United Nations Ambassador John Bolton, who was 
famously quoted as saying that “[t]he Secretariat building in New York has 
 
 4. I am taking this typology from Gary Bellow, as described in Lawyers for a Political 
Movement:  California Rural Legal Assistance, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
LAWYERS:  CASE STUDIES 22, 23–26 (Philip B. Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1988). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Letter from Vladimir Lenin to Y. D. Stasova (Jan. 19, 1905), in 8 LENIN COLLECTED 
WORKS 66–70 (Bernard Isaacs & Isidor Lasker trans., 1962), available at http://www.
marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/jan/19.htm. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER:  THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY (2007). 
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38 stories.  If it lost ten stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.”10  The 
Reagan Administration appointed several prominent lawyers to its agencies 
precisely because they shared the Administration’s ideological opposition 
to the agencies’ missions.  These included opponents of government-funded 
legal services (William Harvey, Clark Durant) nominated to the board of 
the Legal Services Corporation (LSC).11  Others among the best known 
were William Bradford Reynolds, heading the Justice Department’s Civil 
Rights division (and a critic of court-ordered busing and affirmative action), 
and Anne Gorsuch Buford, heading the Environmental Protection 
Agency.12  (A conservative friend of mine, who shall remain anonymous, 
told me in 1981 that he had been offered a human rights job in the Reagan 
State Department, which he turned down because he does not believe in 
human rights.  He was told “That’s why we want you.”) 
Of course, these observations fit together with the anecdote with which 
NeJaime begins his paper, about the Department of Justice’sideological 
screening of appointees so that movement-conservative lawyers would end 
up in civil rights enforcement.  The idea was to rechannel enforcement 
efforts away from racial minorities toward upholding the rights of 
conservative Christians. 
In the past few decades, it has been much easier for right radicals to get 
into government than left radicals.  But it was not always so.  In its earliest 
days, LSC had left radicals like Edgar and Jean Cahn and Clinton 
Bamberger.13  When LSC was criticized for “advocacy of the contentions 
of one side of an economic struggle,” Bamberger (the first head of LSC) 
commented that that is the best one-line definition he had ever heard of the 
War on Poverty.14  To be sure, these lawyers were not radical by the lights 
of May 1968 anarchist euphoria, but they envisioned a wholesale 
restructuring of American capitalism to eliminate poverty, and that qualifies 
as “radical” in the sense I defined above.  They were certainly radical in the 
comprehensiveness of their vision.  The same might be said of New Deal 
lawyers.15  NeJaime also mentions public defenders, and in my own 
experience public defender work often attracts people with a very radical 
 
 10. Anne Applebaum, Defending Bolton, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2005, at A21.  I have 
been unable to locate the origin of Bolton’s famous 1994 quote. 
 11. ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURING 
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 31 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf; 
see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 300 (1988) and sources 
cited therein. 
 12. See Patricia Sullivan, Anne Gorsuch Burford, 62, Dies; Reagan EPA Director, 
WASH. POST, July 22, 2004, at B6 (noting that “Republicans and Democrats alike accused 
Ms. Burford of dismantling her agency rather than directing it to aggressively protect the 
environment”). 
 13. The Cahns were pioneers of the legal services movement as well as of clinical legal 
education, and their article The War on Poverty:  A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 
(1964) was in many ways the master plan for LSC. 
 14. Bellow, supra note 4, at 31. 
 15. See generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982). 
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critique of U.S. criminal justice, particularly on race issues.  But of course 
public defenders are government employees only in the formal sense—their 
day-to-day mission is to fight the government. 
Now, what may be true is that radical lawyers pursue their visionary aims 
through incremental, one-step-at-a-time, we’ll-settle-for-what-we-can-get 
reforms.  This is almost certainly true of environmental cause lawyers.  
Anyone who has seriously studied climate change realizes that economic 
and social institutions will have to be utterly transformed to deal with the 
crisis—but environmentalist lawyers can and do still pursue much more 
bite-sized aims. 
And, returning to the subject of this Symposium, surely the same is true 
of many LGBTQ cause lawyers.  No doubt many envision a society that is 
no longer heteronormative (if I may use this bit of theorists’ jargon), but 
they use the law to pursue goals, like the legality of same-sex marriage, that 
some in their own movement reject because it puts undue emphasis on a 
heteronormative institution.  So one question worth pursuing in further 
study of the phenomenon of cause lawyers in government is whether 
different issues arise when the cause lawyer in government is attached to a 
radical or a law-reform cause.  The question is whether radical cause 
lawyers need to mask or transform their commitments—in a sense, to live 
with a certain degree of bad faith—in a way that the law reformer does not. 
B.  The Varieties of Cause Lawyering 
Let us next turn to the other typology, among cause lawyers involved in 
service-provision, law reform, and political organizing.  A cause lawyer 
might devote her efforts to providing individualized legal services—and 
such a lawyer could conceivably leverage a leadership position into enough 
prominence to enter government service.  But the role in government will 
be very different from the high-level lawyers we have been considering so 
far.  Generally, legal services providers make their impact on the local 
level, which suggests that if they enter government it will most likely be 
local government.16 
For decades, proponents of law reform have voiced suspicion of 
individual service provision as something akin to handing out band-aids 
rather than addressing the root causes of social problems.17  In my view, 
 
 16. The reason that legal services lawyers make their impact at the local level is that 
Congress has prohibited legal services-funded lawyers from high-impact work like filing 
class actions, engaging in lobbying, or taking on any number of controversial issues. See 
Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.  L. No. 104-34, 
110 Stat. 1321-50 to -56 (1996) (especially section 504). 
 17. As one experienced legal aid lawyer notes, “From the very beginning, the critical 
debate regarding Legal Aid has been whether its purpose is to advocate for systemic reform 
to address issues of poverty, or to apply a ‘band-aid approach’ that addresses individual 
needs on a case-by-case basis without challenging systemic causes of those needs—namely 
injustice and poverty.” Jose R. Padilla, California Rural Legal Assistance:  The Struggles 
and Continued Survival of a Poverty Law Practice, 30 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 163, 166 
(2011); see also JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982). 
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this is not always a fair criticism, but both sides of the argument are deeply 
felt:  service providers may be moved by compassion for individuals in 
trouble, and they see virtue in a career devoted to helping people in trouble 
on a face-to-face, retail basis.  The critic wants to make a lasting difference 
for a lot of people, and thinks that band-aids do not do that and, worse, 
legitimize the system.  Among the latter group, the more important 
distinction is between lawyers who pursue legal reform through impact 
litigation or lobbying and those who subordinate legal work to the needs of 
political organizing. 
The organizing approach was taken by Gary Bellow when he headed 
California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) in the 1960s.18  Bellow and his 
colleagues soon concluded that the most important thing they could do for 
their farm-worker clients—more important than filing lawsuits or even 
winning test cases—was boost Cesar Chavez’s efforts to organize the 
United Farm Workers.19  That sometimes meant foregoing an opportunity at 
impact litigation, because it would deflect attention from the union to the 
courtrooms and demobilize workers.  In Bellow’s words, “The worst thing a 
lawyer can do—from my perspective—is to take an issue that could be won 
by political organization and win it in the courts.”20  Instead, legal tactics 
were chosen for their impact on union organizing and morale.  A losing 
lawsuit pursued intelligently might help the union.  For example, in one suit 
Bellow and his colleagues took depositions from tyrannical foremen in the 
field.21  The lawsuit failed, but the tactic was a terrific organizing success 
because it allowed farm workers to see “their” champions taking the all-
powerful adversary down a peg.22 
One of the canonical pieces in the cause-lawyering literature is Stephen 
Wexler’s Practicing Law for Poor People,23 which argued that the only 
form of poor people’s practice that is not self-indulgent is practice that 
subordinates itself to poverty organizing.  “Poverty will not be stopped by 
people who are not poor,” Wexler writes.24  “If poverty is stopped, it will be 
stopped by poor people.  And poor people can stop poverty only if they 
work at it together.  The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must put 
his skills to the task of helping poor people organize themselves.”25  
Wexler’s was a very militant argument, and he drew some quite militant 
conclusions from it, which he freely admitted “violate[] some of the basic 
tenets of the profession.”26  In a particularly poignant example, he suggests 
that a lawyer might deliberately fail to solve a personal problem of a poor 
 
 18. See generally Bellow, supra note 4. 
 19. Id. at 24. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. I heard this story from Gary Bellow. 
 23. 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970). 
 24. Id. at 1053. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
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client who happens to be a good organizer because in the lawyer’s judgment 
solving it would distract her from organizing.27 
NeJaime’s paper acknowledges quite candidly that a lawyer in 
government service will seldom, if ever, be able to practice law with 
“movement” organizing or—more generally—movement politics as the 
aim.  Even if government is not the adversary of the movement, it 
nevertheless needs to stay one step removed from overt partisanship on 
behalf of any movement.  Government has many constituencies, and if it 
orients itself to just one of them it ceases to be democratic and pluralist, and 
instead veers in a dangerously ideological direction, one step removed from 
single-party repression. 
Government service in a pluralist democracy is therefore much more 
amenable to a cause lawyer who has pursued a law reform agenda:  for such 
a lawyer, who may have been laboring upstream for decades trying to 
budge government on important issues, government service is a dream 
come true, because now she has her hands on the levers. 
II.  CONFLICTS 
I now turn to the question of whether government service may—or 
should—disable the lawyer as a cause lawyer.  There are certainly no 
conflicts of interest involved in the major modes of action NeJaime has 
analyzed.  These include, first, an antidiscrimination LGBTQ cause lawyer 
who can now, from within the government, press to make sure that his or 
her own agency does not discriminate.  Second, a cause lawyer can help set 
the agenda of the government agency in a way that lines up with the 
movement’s objectives—for example, by bumping issues of LGBTQ rights 
from the bottom of the agenda nearer to the top.  That seems entirely 
legitimate, a routine part of pluralist democracy.  Third, the cause lawyer 
can provide avenues of access between movement people and government 
officials.  In none of these cases does government service mean that the 
cause lawyer must in any sense abandon the cause. 
But it is not always so easy to use the Ring of Power without answering 
to its own imperatives.  Let me call attention to four sources of tension 
between cause lawyering and government lawyering. 
First, cause lawyers may now have to defend government positions that 
they dislike, or at least speak evasively about them in public fora.  They 
may press their own convictions in deliberations with their colleagues, but 
they will not always prevail.  At that point, their obligations as government 
lawyers take precedence over their movement convictions—or, if they find 
that priority unacceptable, they may have to leave the government.  To take 
a prominent example, it has been widely reported that State Department 
Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh has lost arguments about national 
security policy to more hawkish members of the Obama Administration; 
 
 27. Id. at 1054. 
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but, willingly or not, he has defended the hawkish policies in high profile 
speeches and opinions.28 
Second, the cause lawyer in government may even end up formulating 
policies that, in her former life, would have made her hold her nose.  This is 
a different and deeper matter than being forced to publicly defend decisions 
that the cause lawyer disagrees with.  It is one thing to be outvoted but then 
to have to present a public face representing the administration you belong 
to.  It is quite another to formulate policies that, for political reasons, end up 
so far removed from your own convictions that in private life you would 
have regarded them as a betrayal.  The “problem of dirty hands”29 is 
endemic in government.  The philosopher Avishai Margalit has argued 
persuasively that to achieve important ends one may have to accept bad 
compromises, so long as they are not rotten compromises, by which 
Margalit means “an agreement to establish or maintain an inhuman 
regime.”30  Suppose the cause lawyer goes along with Margalit.  It follows 
that the lawyer may have to accept bad compromises in policy making that 
he or she would denounce as a movement lawyer.  Not only will 
government lawyers have to defend these compromises, they will do so 
knowing that they themselves were involved in formulating the noisome 
policies. 
Third, the government lawyer—especially in the executive branch—is no 
longer entitled to push deeply one-sided interpretations of the law, because 
of the faithful execution obligation which transmits from the President to 
executive branch lawyers.31  The lawyer writing legal opinions for the 
executive branch has shifted roles from an advocate to an advisor, and the 
advisor’s role requires (in the words of the American Bar Association 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1) independent professional 
judgment and candid advice.32  One of the failings of the Bush 
Administration’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) was the way that it 
aggressively pressed to build extreme legal positions into the fabric of the 
law by embedding them in OLC opinions.33 
 
 28. See generally DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE:  THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE 
SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY (2012) (describing Koh’s role in Obama national security 
deliberations); Paul Starobin, Op-Ed., A Moral Flip-Flop, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, at SR5 
(criticizing Koh for reversing his own long-standing positions); Carrie Johnson, Human 
Rights Defender Now Fights For U.S. Policy, NPR (June 28, 2011), http://www.npr.org/
2011/06/28/137454984/human-rights-defender-now-fights-for-u-s-policy. 
 29. See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Political Action:  The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & 
PUB. L. 160 (1973). 
 30. AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISES AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 2 (2010). 
 31. Under Article II, Section 3, Clause 5 of the Constitution, the President must “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.  I discuss its 
application to government lawyers in “That the Laws Be Faithfully Executed”:  The Perils of 
the Government Legal Advisor, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002). 
 33. I have discussed this problem in several places. See What Went Wrong:  Torture and 
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11–14 
(2009) (statement of David Luban, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center); 
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Fourth, lawyers may find it hard to return to cause lawyering after 
leaving government service.  For one thing, ethics rules and statutes limit 
their capacity to take adverse positions to their former client, and that might 
prove quite restrictive unless the work the lawyers did for the government 
was unrelated to the cause.34  Confidentiality rules may prevent her even 
from talking about what she did in government, and they clearly forbid her 
from “us[ing] information relating to the representation to the disadvantage 
of the former client.”35  Over and above the ethics rules, the work of 
government lawyers may be classified.  But perhaps more important than 
either of these formal bars, a former government lawyer may develop 
personal loyalties to colleagues still in government, or loyalty to the 
administration that appointed her.  For all these reasons, she may be deeply 
reluctant to take on the adversarial role that cause lawyering so often 
demands. 
It does not have to be so.  Some former government lawyers become 
vociferous critics of their own administration’s policies after they leave; 
although the best-known examples are not movement lawyers returning to 
the movement, there is no reason why a cause lawyer could not adopt that 
role as well. 
On the other hand, the cause lawyer’s comrades in the movement may no 
longer welcome her back into the fold.  The bad compromises she helped 
engineer, the public defenses of the administration’s positions, and her 
unwillingness to criticize them, hang over her; her friends in the movement 
may find her stay in government disappointing or worse.  This, too, does 
not have to happen; and when it does it is sad, ironic, and perhaps deeply 
unfair.  Yet perhaps, given the pervasiveness of bad compromises in 
government, it is inevitable.  I regard it as a kind of paradox built into the 
very concept of compromise.36  Commitment to a cause means commitment 
to seeing its goals realized.  A compromise is simultaneously a partial 
realization and a partial abandonment of one’s goals.  Purists within the 
movement focus on the abandonment; the engineer of the compromise 
focuses on the achievement.  Both have a point.  Cause lawyering within 
government therefore stands on a kind of moral knife-edge, and NeJaime’s 
paper invites us to think in concrete terms about how lawyers negotiate the 
 
DAVID LUBAN, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
162 (2007); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, in THE TORTURE 
DEBATE IN AMERICA 35 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006); David Luban, Tales of Terror:  
Lessons for Lawyers from the ‘War on Terrorism,’ in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS:  TAKING 
STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 56 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010). 
 34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2002) (discussing former client 
conflicts); id. at R. 1.11 (discussing former government lawyers); see also 18 U.S.C. § 207 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (discussing a statutory bar to former officers, employees, and elected 
officials). 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9. 
 36. See David Luban, Bargaining and Compromise:  Recent Work on Negotiation and 
Informal Justice, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397, 414–16 (1985). 
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demands of their own career commitments in a situation at once so 
promising and so difficult. 
